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RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
Michael J Perry, Love and Power The Role of Religion and Morality mAmencan 
Politics, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, vm, 218pp. 
Sayuri Saito 
In Love and Power加lichaelJ Peπy'" endeavors to articulate the proper relation 
of morality to politics in a religiously and morality pluralistic soc<ety The book 
o町e四aconstructive contribution to a political dialogue from which the contempo 
rary constltut<onal and pohtical theories have tried to exclude relig<ous connotation. 
Perry has elaborated compellmg arguments that focus on the role of moral con-
victions to poht<cal deliberation in his pnor work, Morality, Politics, and L訓 vIn its 
conclusion he has suggested that’＇pohtic< in a mo四日yplu四日Sl!CS田 ietyis about the 
credibility of competing conceptions of human good, and that political theory fails to 
addre<s question of human good <S vacuous and irrelevant.叩＇ Inother words, pohti-
cal theory that brackets moral essential aspects of one's very self. What the author 
means in saying ’＇one's very self' turns out to be being "t四 ly,fully human＇『whichhe 
coπectly pomts out to be of great importance m speculating upon fundamental po Iiti 
cal issues 
Assertmg that no grounds of a competing pohtical ch01ce can be "neutral", the 
author develops the argument for the possibility of ”ecumemcal political dialogue”． 
He successfully maintams that an ideal of ’＇ecumenical pohtics”，which embraces 
moral or rehgio JS convictions about human good, nourishes a form of poht1cal dis-
coo四ema prolific way. 
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The book starts by addressing a question”What 1s the proper role, 1f any, of 
religious moral discourse in the politics of a relig1ously and morally plu回listicsoci 
ety hke the United States? If religious-moral discourse should not be excluded from 
'the public square', how should 1t be included: how should such discourse be brought 
to bear in the practice of political justi日cation？”（p.5)
Facing these kinds of crucial questions, Perry contends, most of the constitutional 
or political theonsts such as Bruce Ackermanl＂，百10masNegel仰，KentGreenawalt【＂
have not taken them seriously and have elaborated 『'neutral”pohucs,which Perry 
claims to be impossible拘.Perry accuses Ackerman and Negel of their fraudulent 
leg1timat1on of the political choices in the way they pretend to be”neutral”． 
In this respect, the book ofc出 anotherform of attack to・＇liberals’『accusingthem 
of relying ultimately upon independent and問asonable"selr', thus neglectmg reli-
g1ous belief as a tenable JUStification of political issues Similar clain】Sof exclusion 
and silencing has been made by feminists and those who claim racial equality. Just as 
feminists claim出attheir a田ertionof gender equality has been an indispensable force 
in the endorsement of rights enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, Perry asserts that some kind of religious view is a necessary unde中m-
mngof1mpoロantpolillcal values or the notion of human rights. 
百ms,his first question raised above can be restated as "how can such claims 
claims that such-and-such a (moral) right ought, as a moral matter, to confer such-
and-such a rights on (virtually) al human beings, that conferral of the rights 1s mor-
aly陀quired be justified, if at 叫I?Can such claims be iustified without reliance on 
further問hanceon further claims, sometimes disputed, about human good引（》.30)In 
other words, can such claims be credible without askmg what It means to be ”truly 
fully human"?(p.41, emphasis addeのHedevotes a ful chapter to examine the ques-
tion, and concludes that”a practice of political justification from which disputed 
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beliefs about human good a日 excludedJacks the normative resources required for 
the addressing our most fundamental pohucal-moral questions, hke questions about 
human rights＇『（p42) 
I 
Thus, the qu田tionis not whether to mix religion and politics, but how to mix 
them. That 1s, "how, in what way or ways, ought religious (and other) moralities to be 
poht1c1zed m a society as relig1ously and morally pluralistic?"(p.82) He approaches 
this question with his d1scuss10n of ’『ecumenicalpolitical dialogue” 
Before turning to the author’s case for "ecumenical political dialogue”，it would 
be helpful to examme briefly his idea of”religion". Perry defines religious faith as 
”trust in the ultimate meaningfulness of life--that is, the ultimate meaningfulness of 
the world and of one's life, one's own being，出paロofand related to, as embedded in, 
the world.＇『Asone of the陀 viewersof this book points out<", Peπy’s definition of 
問hgiousfaith is indisputably ascribed to the understanding of religion maintained by 
Paul Tillich. Developing Tillich’s approach, Perry presumes that it is unnecessary to 
use the term”God" to apprehend the essence of religious faith：”a person of faith 
need not even be a theist, in the sense of one who finds God-talk meaningful.”（p.72) 
In問finmgthe definition of religious faith, Perry employs a situation that compels 
one to encounter with a feeling or view that one is”a stranger, an 副ien,homeless, 
anx10us, vulnerable，曲目atened,ma world, a universe, that is, finally and radically, 
unfamiliar, hostile, perhaps even pmntless, absurd "(p 68) One response to the situa 
tion is to conclude that life is finally meaningless, and that if it IS to be meaningful, 
that meaningfulness must be originated by that person. The other 1s’＇religious＇’a”the 
trust that life 1s ultimately meaningful" or a belief that "one is or can be bound or 
connected to the world, and, above al, to Ultimate Reality ma profoundly intimate 
and ultimately meaningful way.”（p 70) 
Now, turning to examine the main discussion. Perry elaborates two complemen 
76 
tary practices as the principal constnuents of ecumenical pohtics, a certain kind of 
dialogue and a ce口amkmd of tolerance.(p.83) Ecumenical dialogue entalis two ati-
tudes; notion of the fact of falhb1hsm and pluralism. "To be a falhb1hst is essentially 
toemb悶cethe ideal of self-cntical rationality. To be a plu悶hstis to understand that 
a morally pluralistic context can often be a mo問 fertilesource of deepening moral 
insight than can a momstic context."(p.!01) Equipped wnh the two attitudes, ecu-
menical dialogue supports ongoing pohucal critique and self-cnucal reflective p四c-
tices. He also asserts two crucial virtues in dialo呂田s，＇’publicintelligib1hty and pub-
lic accessibility.”（pp 105-8) 
What Perry idealizes as religious discourse is one that meet these two standar由
He characterizes’＇public intelhg1bility’『asa dmlogic virtue and defines if as follows: 
”It is the habit of trying to elaborate one's position ma manner intelligible or compre 
hensible to those who speak a different religious or moral language--to the pomt of 
translating one's position, to the extent possible, mto a shared language”（p.!06）百1e
viロueof ”public accessibility”is "the habit of trying to defend one's position m a 
manner neither sectarian nor authoritarian "(p. 106) 
In adduion, he nonetheless concedes that’＇ecumenical political dialogue" is surely 
an impo目antelement of the social soil in which dialogue must grow, if it is to grow 
at al. Tolerance is an important precondition of dialogue吋p.129)What he defines 
as the constituent of”ecumenical political tolerance”is "(a) poht1cal tolerance, toler-
ance on the paロofus and our epresentatives acting politically, qua state, and (b) of 
behefs judged false and of behaviour judged immoral”（p 129) He devotes the last 
chapter to discussing the vmbihty of ”ecumenical political tolerance" rather than 
coercive politics by specifying several considerations: fallibilism (in conjunction with 
pluralism), self-mte日st,compassion, community, and consciousness (pp.129 38) 
Thus, he contends that "(a)lthough hbe四lismas neutrahty is a dead end, hberalism-
as-tolerance IS not.…Tolerance is the only viable way of preserving the liberal com 
m1tment to individual freedom in a genuine political community”（p 138) 
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In the conclusion of this book, Perry shows his confidence that’＇ecumenical po・
litical dialogue and tolerance”constitutes a form of political community that takes 
very seriously an image---a moral image that 1s also a poht1cal image that 1s, finally, 
a religious image--central of "the Jerusalem-based 問ligious":an image that "st陀sses
equality and also fraternity, as in the metaphor of the whole human race as One 
Family.＇『（p.145)As that image depicts, what he contends as an ideal of political com-
mumty is one m which love (agape) and power are intimately combined.百lUS,"the 
central problem of politics for some of us, given our deepest convictions－一一閃hgious
convictions---about the truly, fully human way to live, is the relation of love to 
power.＇’（p.145) 
CONCLUSION 
Wntmg Love and Power, Perry has done much to surpass the treacherous and 
futile history of the relation between religious convictions and political choices, and 
to signify a new paradigm for the resolution of political divisiveness m a morally 
pluralistic s出 1ety.In his robust attempt to answer the question he raised at the begin-
nmg, he offers what we may call ”ecumenical version”of John Rawls・”ideaof an 
overlapping consensus"'"' though Perry distingmshes himself from Rawls in chapter 
I of this book As this review might have pointed out, the function of”ecumenical 
political dialogue" is best accomplished where the "plurality of reasonable but m-
compatible comprehensive doctrine"" secured. 
Though Perry often talks about "community，＇刷 helargely concedes that a com-
munity cannot su円iveunless <t tolerates the various incompatible religious or moral 
convictions, and thus offers a ground for "a deliberat<ve, transfo口nat<vepolitics--as 
distmct from a politics that 1s merely mampulauve and selιserving.『＂＇＂
As Perry himself admitted, whereas”l<beralism-as-neutrality”is obsolete and ex-
hausted，”liberalism-as-tolerance＇・1s"the only viable way of preserving the liberal 
commitment to md<v1dual freedom in a genume political community.＇’（p.138）百1e
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adv凹 atesof modem liberal political theory such as John Rawls or Ronald Dworkm, 
seek to clanfy the prospect of agreement over common good through ’＇Justice”m 
pa巾cularsense Take Rawls for example. In his often-quoted 1987 article m Oλiford 
Journal of Legal Studies, Rawls asserts the idea of ”an overlapping consensus，＂＇川
from which he denves the legitimacy of pursuing出ecommon gord in the religiously, 
morally, and politic剖lyplu阻hsucsociety such as the United States. This idea of an 
overlappmg consensus enables social unity to be well-balanced and secures a con-
cept of justice endurable over the generations. 
However valuable this book's contnbution might be, he seems to fail arguing one 
of the conceivable unde中inningsof his discussion Is "ecumenicalpoht1cal dialogue" 
stil religious, as he maintains, if it satisfies the two prerequisites ("public mtellig1bil-
ity and public accessibility") he assignsワThatis, the Rawlsian concept of political 
liberalism"" which is restricted by and grounded m”the fact of pluralism" m effect 
seeks to gain similar just1日cationin a more secular term After al, if『＇ecumenical
poht1cal dialogue”is provided with "public intelligibility and public accessibility" 
under the circumstances of a large, pluralistic, liberal political community like the 
United States, does it st日lhave significance to be claimed as religious? Peπy might 
clam】”ecumenicalpolitical dialogue”to be religious m Its origin I would nonethe-
les say that evoking the「ruly,fully human way to live＇・isindeed e町ectivederiving 
most of its ideal not from the language of”the Jerusalem based religions”which 
Perry mostly relies on, but from many other religious or non-religious ideals which 
he does not take so seriously. 
Moreover, the "truly, fully human way to live" could be derived from non-reli-
gious moral beliefs which comprises genuinely transcendent content equivalent to 
convenlional religious beliefs'"'. Religion is not the exclusive, though most com-
mon, source of convictions about how and why human hfe has intrinsic value目As
Dworkin pomts out in discussing the real issue m Rae v. Wade,"" an atheist might 
have convictions about sanctity, the importance and the value of human life, and 
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"these convictions are JUSt as pervasive, just as foundational to moral personality, as 
the convictions of a Catholic or a Moslem,"1＇幻 andsuch beliefs could participate 
properly m political dialogue as Perry propounds exclusively for the Jerusalem-based 
religions. 
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